Gramsci and *cultural studies* in the dual economy of the United States

A preliminary sketch[1]

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ABSTRACT

In this article, I have tried to submit patterns in US academic cultural studies and Gramsci scholarship to a brief comparative analysis against the background of the generic amalgamations of three national formations by the 1980's: reproduction and maintenance of a consumerist "common sense" through credit card debts, accelerations in economic under-developments in a dual-economy, and the cultural reproduction of a collective psychic anchorage in self-perceptions of exceptionality and moral superiority in relation to racialized "others" in domestic and international spheres. My analysis distinguished patterns in academic cultural studies from those in Gramsci scholarship in that the former predominantly focused on aspects of discriminatory representations in the cultural practices of the "national" spheres whereas the latter tended to orient itself on "international" analyses in human geography, environmental studies, climate change, development theory, global social moments, global conservatisms, and so on. I concluded that in light of the important role which the Gramsci's legacy had assumed in the UK Birmingham School, the moment is opportune and necessary for Gramsci scholars in the US, as elsewhere, to make use of the most important Gramsci-inspired diagnostic instruments in the development of comprehensive research projects on the neo-liberal manipulations of the material and emotional institutions of diverse populations amidst a dual economy defined post-democratic age.

The academic rise of cultural studies by the 1980's coincided with the crystallization of three major interconnected national formations in the United States. First, the multi-media public relations regime which had been set up since the end of World War I to "manufacture consent" to patterns of material consumption had reached unprecedented levels of information-technological sophistication in manipulating public consciousness and conduct[2]. As global capitalisms underwent successive crises, and purchasing power diminutions limited further expansion of middle class strata, the population consented to predatory impositions of credit card debts for the continuous satisfaction of under-scrutinized excessive consumption habits[3]. Second, the engineering of consent to credit debt coincided with a major shift in the U.S economy and so-

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ciety which has now resulted in what has been defined as a "dual economy"[4]. The public relations regimes have ideologically framed and articulated "the new common sense" of this shift. It is rooted in a neoliberal political response to the global transformations in capitalism and it now resulted in an economy in which 80% of the population work in low-wage sectors. The majority is white. The remaining 20% of the population work in the information technology sectors which are comprised, according to Peter Temin, of Finance, Technology, and Electronics (FTE)[5]. In the FTE sector, workers arrive with high levels of networked social capital and "human capital", as they are university educated technologists, engineers, and financial analysts. The 1% or the oligarchy of the population at large have promoted the values of low taxes and limited federal government, while 1% of the 1% of the 1% purchase presidential and congressional elections[6]. The elites of the FTE sectors have highly influenced "the new common sense" embedded in new public policies, which resulted in a dual education system and in high incarceration levels of the African American population since the 1980's. Consequently, social mobility from low-wage sector to the FTE sector – which requires high levels of education or "human capital" as well as high levels of financial assets – has become increasingly difficult or has highly indebted young generations. The third national formation which intersected with the economic

shifts of the 1980's and the unprecedented manufacturing of consent to unrelenting ideologies of materialist consumerisms pertains to an elite driven organization of mass conformity and political acquiescence to mass psychological dispositions to moral superiority in the domestic and geopolitical arenas. This organization also dates back to the end of the World War I era and is reflected in an under-scrutinized or unconscious consent to the values of "American exceptionalism" in a global framework. In the domestic framework, it is reflected by both increasing and decreasing historical moments of both active and passive consent to systematic reproductions of racist and misogynistic practices[7]. Against the background of these generic integrations of three national formations by the 1980's – consumption maintenance through credit card debts, accelerations in economic under-development in a dual economy, and the organization of a psychic anchorage in perceptions of exceptionality or moral superiority as against domestic and non-domestic "others" – that I have tried to submit patterns in Gramsci scholarship and US academic cultural studies to a brief comparative analysis. With this preliminary sketch, I would like to raise the question as to what critical Gramsci scholarship in the U.S. may have to contribute to a diagnostic of the "new common sense" as we appear to move towards a post-democratic society.

It is useful to distinguish between general developmental patterns in the

humanities discipline of *Cultural Studies* in the US academy since the 1980's, on one hand, and between much broader evolutions in the immense research fields of information, communication, and media technologies, on the other hand. The latter, which is often referred to in shorthand as "cultural studies", have now reached such enormous expansions as they focus on questions pertaining to the production, application, and use of new technologies in the area of video games, digital media, reality TV, journalism, world media, and so on[8]. Here I would like to limit myself to the humanities discipline of *Cultural Studies* which historically had academic affiliations with media, communication, and film studies. As such it initially focused on the history of the advertisement industry, on the history of broadcasting and television, and on the history of the cinema, as well as on the more technical relations between image, sound, and word in the production of messages. However, against the background of a heightened consciousness of the extensive history of the centrality of the multi-media information-technological "manufacture of consent" apparatuses in the structures of every-day life it should come as no surprise that the specific discipline of *Cultural Studies* in the US academy in the 1980's had been increasingly committed to sustained analysis and critique of the discriminatory representations of women and ethnic minorities in visual media, print media,

television, film, literature, art[9]. In this they also reflected their affinities with the multicultural rights environments which in turn had been nurtured to a large extent by the values of the civil rights movements, women's movements, anti-Vietnam movements and the student movement of the 1960's[10]. Among these values were resistance to elite organized social control through by way of cultural instruments. As a result, the study of visual, symbolic, and semantic representations of minorities and women in the advertisement industry, in the Hollywood cinema, as well as in print journals, magazines, and in popular music produced an enormously large body of literature. Furthermore, *Cultural Studies* critically examined elements of consumer culture in general, including fashion, celebrity culture, beauty contests, sports cultures. In this they had critically focused on aspects of the culture industry, understood as practices of a *cultural hegemony* on the part of elite strata. With the exception of African American contributions to these types of cultural analyses, however, the predominant conceptions of cultural hegemony and culture industry remained separated from an economic nucleus. Working from the premise that the practices of *Cultural Studies* constituted a form of resistance to cultural hegemony, there was also a tendency to seek expressions of resistance performativities to mainstream cultures of consumption and represen-

tation through analyses of popular culture, youth cultures, rap music, graffiti cultures, and cartoon cultures. With the advent of the internet, life on the screen, cyberspace, virtuality, and social media, in the contexts of which questions of the limits to democratic participation have reasserted themselves as against technological coercions and dominations in the practices of every-day life, *Cultural Studies* discourse has as of late shifted somewhat in its self-perception as resistance avant-guard.

Thus, for instance, in almost all the journal series I have consulted, there were, over the past five years, calls for greater political articulations. Against the background of the structural changes in the US academy, which in effect threaten the survival of *Cultural Studies* as a humanist discipline, articles on the future of the humanities, and the future of the research university, have also increasingly appeared. In other words, *Cultural Studies* research output of the 1980's and 1990's had followed the general discursive and theoretical trends in the US humanities which focused on modernism-postmodernism debates, deconstruction, post-structuralisms, and performativity theory. Thematically, the journal series moved from "The Construction of Gender", "Punk-Deconstruction", "Black Aesthetics", and "Fanon's Fetish" to "Rereading of Orientalism", "Queer Visibility in Commodity Culture", "The Politics of Over-Conformity", "Trauma and Cultural Aftereffects", "Historical Secularisms", "Voyeurisms", "Performing Cultural Politics", "Bio-pedagogies", and "Post-Racial and Post-Racist Strategies". While the journal series reacted to specific political events – Presidential Election, Presidential Impeachment – in the new millennium a new sensibility embraced critical questions pertaining to surveillance, biometrics, failure of intellectual leadership after nine/eleven, the suppression of democratic discourse, and a crisis of democracy. These attempts to more systematically link cultural questions to politics to some extent seem to reflect existential anxieties in relation to a new political reality of coercion, suppression, and self-censorship. One thing is certain, though: As the unprecedented information technological revolutions have engulfed our lives, debates on the relations between technology and democracy, common among the Frankfurt School oriented critical wings of the boomer generations, have resurfaced[11]. From the current debates and research projects on democratic participation in the new age of information technologies, the internet, and the world-wide web, three major trends have emerged: For one, generic philosophical "optimists" view continuous unfettered technological evolutions as a source of the improvement of the material, social, and cultural well-being of the populations at large derived from the assumption that "technology knows what it wants"[12]. This is a

perception reflected in the general public discourses of Silicon Valley high tech leaders who are largely responsible for the knowledge generation organizations that condition the FTE sector of the US economy. The second trend consists of generic philosophical "pessimists" who problematize the relations between self and technology as there is persuasive empirical evidence of increases in social alienation, social fragmentation, political apathy, post-emotionality, and personality disorders due to the unrelenting technological penetrations into contemporary bodies, minds, and souls[13]. Sherry Turkle has pursued this line of research for over thirty years while coining key concepts such as "the second self", "life on the screen" and "alone together"[14]. A third trend upholds the argument that technology in itself is neither negative nor positive, as it depends on its application by individual and collective users[15]. Internet technologies enable the conditions for both corporate control and autonomous participatory cultures. To the credit of the academic *Cultural Studies* community over the past thirty years or so, they have neither embraced a facile optimistic nor a facile pessimistic philosophy on the subject of information technologies in the midst of an academic environment in which the FTE sector relentlessly drives the reproduction of the "human capital" of future finance, technology, and electronics operators. In a debate on the subject of "convergence culture" which holds that media users, by converging with others in the creation of new ideas, art, and political projects and so on, create the conditions for new collective productive possibilities, *Cultural Studies* operators maintained a nuanced approach to the complexities inherent in the relations between a corporate media logic and agential empowerment of individual and collective media users[16]. In sum, apart from the work of Marcia Landy, there are few direct traces to Gramsci's work in the *Cultural Studies* journal series, except for a very general adaptation of the concept of cultural hegemony[17]. One of the reasons I suppose is that the Gramsci editions available in English until Joe Buttigieg's translation of the four Gerratana volumes of the *Prison Notebooks* were overall difficult texts to absorb for students interested in contemporary culture. I am thinking here of the Hoare-Smith edition of 1971. Gramsci's own cultural analysis, with his extraordinary detailed focus on Italian society, requires the kind of historical knowledge of developments and transformation which in the US is usually constructed by social historians inspired by the *Annales* tradition. Even the Forgacs-Nowell-Smith edition on cultural writings (1985) present comprehension difficulties as Gramsci's cultural, historical, theoretical, philosophical, and economic references require a broad intellectual horizon. By the same token, Derek Boothman's *Further Selections*, while immensely attractive to

critical historians of the social sciences, may not be useful to contemporary media and culture students whose focus is in general not on the connections between the present, the past, and the future. The focus is predominantly on the present. Hopefully, with complete access to Joe Buttigieg's *Prison Notebooks* in English, greater attention to the scope and purpose of Gramsci's work will result.

Compared to the *Cultural Studies* research orientations briefly reviewed above, the Gramsci research output in the US distinguishes itself on at least twelve accounts[18]. One, its scope is more internationally oriented, as it produces comparative analyses of neoliberalisms in a variety of global regions[19]. Two, it opens up new terrains of inquiry by aligning Gramscian concepts with human geography, environmental studies, climate change, and development theory[20]. Three, it applies Gramscian critical concepts to contemporary social movements abroad and in the US, such as analyses of the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, Tahrir Square, and Podemos[21]. Four, it revisits questions of historical materialism, historical sociology, and worker's movements[22]. Five, it pays attention to the global networks of conservative radicals, as by looking at the role of Evangelicals in global politics or by analyzing the return to religion[23]. Six, it analytically operates with Gramscian core concepts such as the function of "intellectuals", "subal-

terns", the "state" and of the formation of "passive" revolutions[24]. Seven, it analyzes the resistance to corporate hegemony and neoliberalism in the field of education[25]. Eight, it maintains a historical analysis[26]. Nine, it addresses questions of hegemony in law and the relations between sovereignty and international law[27]. Ten, it further develops conceptual inter-sectionalities between the categories of race, ethnicity, class, and caste as developed by the Birmingham School and by Subaltern Studies[28]. Eleven, the experiences of diversity allow it to deepen our understanding of the variations in "structures of feeling" underlying formations of values, norms, and consciousness[29]. Twelve, it continues to provide comprehensive accounts of or introductions to Gramsci's life, work, and correspondence in English, which is one of the conditions for initial scholarly occupation with Gramsci by non-Italian speaking intellectual operators and it continues to organize collective projects on key categories of Gramsci's thought[30]. What Gramsci research output in the US over-all reveals is, on one hand, an "internationalization" in orientation, which, while it is generally absent in *Cultural Studies*, also obtains in the work of contributors to still existing US socialist journals. On the other hand, what it reveals is a *dialectical substratum* between it and the predominant conceptual frameworks of Edward Said's *Oriental-*

ism and his other writings, and of the idea of the "subaltern" as developed by Charlene Spivack against the background of the Indian Subaltern Studies Project. To the extent to which Said's stature as prominent public intellectual is inseparable from the *Question of Palestine*, and to the extent to which Spivack's conceptual disposition is intertwined with Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralism, and the post-modern project at large, there is no doubt that most Gramsci researchers must have been faced at one point or another with thinking profoundly about a number of fundamental geopolitical questions as well as questions pertaining to uneven and fragmented theoretical politics that defined our era over the past thirty to fourty years. What most Gramsci's scholars bring to the table, then, is a global approach to contemporary problems perhaps because many of them appear to have appropriated from Gramsci the insight that «the national personality [...] just as the individual personality, is an abstraction unless we place it in an international [and social] network»[31]. I think that this disposition is capitally important because it enables Gramsci scholars to return to an organic tradition of linking national politics with the international, the geopolitical, and the transnational. I am referring to Martin Luther King Jr, one of the major leaders of the civil rights movement, who one year before

his murder had powerfully linked the discrimination structures to which the African-American populations were subjected to the imperialist war in Vietnam[32].

I will come to a conclusion: It is a common place to state that US *Cultural Studies* had been inspired by the Birmingham School in the context of which both Raymond Williams (1921-1988) and Stuart Hall (1932-1014) had pioneered extraordinary "Gramscian diagnostics" of their social environments, as Perry Anderson articulated it in a brand-new delightful book on *The H Word*: *Peripetaia of Hegemony*[33]. In this publication, Anderson traces the use of the term hegemony in a variety of contexts, in particular in that of British and US American realist international relations theorists. It includes a chapter on a non-international relations oriented use of the term, and it focuses on critical intellectuals. In a few beautifully sketched paragraphs, Anderson reminds us that Gramsci had engaged in microscopic inquiries into the "structures of feeling" that bind values, norms, meanings on a deep level as when he wondered about the values of the inner life of a maid in her maid-quarters reading serial novels. Attention to detail in subcultural expressions in the spheres of art, music, folklore, photography would reveal resistance moments to hegemonic appropriations[34]. What Anderson emphasizes in his brief on Birminghamian Gramscianism is above all Stuart Hall as a profound *Zeit-*

kritiker: living amidst the rise of Thatcherism during moral, economic, and social crises and the reactions to these by various social strata, including that of a "backlash of petty-bourgeois stamp", Hall not only anticipated Thatcher's response to the crisis – a hegemonic project, the *common sense* of which combined for popular consumption contradictory social interests, incoherent ideologies with coherent ones, and stable identities with unstable ones. But Hall also predicted Thatcher's return. Gramscian concepts such as "historic bloc", "passive revolution" and "economic nucleus" applied to local transformations in the making that had enabled Hall to diagnose the material and normative elements of the hegemonic project and to respond to it through the invention of new transformatory blocs. These would involve the microscopic and diagnostic study of "culture", viewed from the point of view of the material institutions (work, taxes health, wages) as well as of that of emotional institutions (sexuality, family, ethnicity, race, gender, education, leisure, consumption)[35]. Anderson's brief review of Gramscian concepts of hegemony in the critical operations of the Birmingham projects is extraordinarily timely in its recall to fine-tuned precisions on what is possible in Gramscian-inspired cultural studies. I wonder if he has British Cultural Studies in mind, which to this day – in spite of backlashes – is institutionally considerably more solidified than US *Cultural Studies*. I would

like to relay to the Gramsci community and other cultural operators for consideration his call to comprehensive research projects on the material and emotional institutions of diverse populations under neoliberal regimes. It would require an organization of a broad research project because nothing of the sort can be done by a few intellectuals alone. Yet in the era of the dual economy, of the dual education system, the dual health care system, of the purchase of congressional votes, of disproportionate incarceration of minorities, of eruptions of new misogynies, of surveillance, police coercion, threats to independent judiciaries and freedom of speech – in this time of the dual economy I wonder whether it would be more adequate to begin to pursue disquisitions into the actual practices of the coercion and domination apparatuses, the money transfer from the 1% of 1% of 1% to the congressional votes. To pursue disquisitions into the decisions of the republican 68 governors, into the decisions of 99 state legislators who are republican, into the creation and the actions of para-military forces or police auxiliaries in local government, to trace federal dollar diversions into private accounts, to trace the creation of commissions of accreditation of working class colleges for purposes of dismantling relative autonomy while downsizing them and rendering them inoperative, to trace the money chain that endows the radically conservative radio stations, the conservative think tanks, and

the violence, hatred, and the dismissiveness spouted by their radical right wing intellectuals and journalists. We also need inquiries into the analytics firms which from Canada and the US were involved in the organization of the UK Brexit. This is a "historic bloc" of enormously broad and intricate dimensions, and it requires diagnostics of the Gramscian kind to unprecedented degrees. Peter Temin, the economist of the concept of the dual economy which I introduced at the beginning of this article, explained that he had appropriated the model of the dual economy from a developmental economist of the 1950's. The model stated that in a developing capitalist economy, the capitalist strata impose subsistence wages on the peasants. When the peasants leave for the city, they are faced with wages that are comparable to those of the country. They are trapped. Temin believes that this model is applicable to an un-developing capitalist formation as well as it is currently unfolding in the United States. For in today's dual economy, 80% low wage workers are subjected to the elites of the elites of the finance, technology, and electronics sector while the elites purchase congressional votes of their liking for reductions in public policy in the area of health care, education, environment, transportation, universities. Faced with this "historic bloc" are we, as Gramsci asked, that by an "irony of nature", or by historical indeterminacies and contingencies, (as) individual and collective ac-

tors, «without either proposing or willing it, […] forced to obey the imperatives of history?»[36]. If so, one of the imperative derivatives will require us to connect the dots – as against the predominant multi-media apparatuses's habitual separation of dialectical relations – between domestic and international coercion and domination regimes as the United States finds itself in the midst of what appears to become another thirty years war.

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1 _ Saggio ricevuto su invito.

2 _ President Wilson had established a Committee on Public Information or CPI on April 14, 1917, the day before the US entered World War I. It was to influence public opinion on the legitimacy of the war as well as message world-wide propaganda on the "gospel of Americanism". New technologies, ranging from photography, the telegraph and radio broadcast to telephony, cables, and film were applied to the diffusion of the gospel. Edward Bernays (1891-1995) joined the CPI, bringing to the table great interests in the nascent social sciences, particularly in social psychology and mass psychology which he applied to research on the organization of the relations between heterogeneous collective psychic spaces and external control and manipulation of it. Bernay's public relations machine incorporated four core ideas: 1. the active energy of the intelligent few' will make sure that the public at large will become aware of and act upon new ideas in politics and business; 2. the technical means that had "been invented and developed" can regi-

ment public opinion' such that an "intelligent minority" can guide the masses' in a democracy; 3. Since every government is only a government through acquiescent public opinion, the tools of propaganda would "manufacture consent" to the ideas and deeds of governments; 4. a presidential candidate may be «drafted» in response to «over-whelming popular demand, but is well-known that his name may be decided upon by half a dozen men sitting around a table in a hotel room». See E. BERNAYS, *Propaganda*. With an Introduction by M.C. Miller (1928), IG Publishing, New York, Brooklyn 2005.

3 _ For the historical emergence of the US middle class see S. BLUMIN, *The Emergence of the Middle Class: Social Experience in the American City 1760-1900*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (N.Y.) 1989. For the extraordinary impacts of technological innovations in general, and the automobility in particular on the transformations of US society see J.J. FLINK, *The Automobile Age*, MIT Press, Boston (Ma.) 1988. For a more general introduction to technology and modern families see C.S. FISCHER, *America Calling. A Social History of the Telephone to 1940*, University of California Press, Berkeley (Ca.) 1992.

4 _ As early as 1985, M.B. KATZ published his *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse. A Social History of Welfare in America*, Basic Books, New York 1985, where he dedicated the third part of the book on the "war on welfare". B. EHRENREICH's *Fear of Falling. The Inner Life of the Middle Class* (Pantheon Books, New York 1990) poignantly described a penchant among the middle-class strata to remain disinterested in the working class as the society as a whole had advanced through a decade of greed.

5 _ The phenomenon of the "dual economy" had been recognized over twenty years ago by leading information technological sociologists such as Manuel Castells, whose analysis of the new networked, global, and informational economy distinguished between "generic labor" and "self-programmable labor". See his *The Rise of the Network Society* (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1996², in particular pp. 77-163 on "The New Economy"). Saskia Sassen also discussed the disproportionately growing socio-economic gaps between finance-technology high human capital labor and low wage service labor in her *A Sociology of Globalization* (W.W. Norton and Company, New York-London 2007) in terms of "emerging global classes". While both approached this problem from a global perspective, Peter Temin focuses on the United States in his *The Vanishing Middle Class: Prejudice and Power in a Dual Economy*, MIT Press, Boston (Ma.) 2017.

6 _ Recent studies from the Roosevelt Institute have indicated that it is particularly the finance and telecommunication industry that not only accumulates billions from the population at large, but also that it is their lobby that most successfully pursues the purchase of congressional votes. See T. FERGUSON, J. CHEN, P. JORGENSON, *Fifty Shades of Green: High Finance, Political Money, and the U.S. Congress* at Rooseveltinstitute.org. They also present data on mainstream political science underestimation of the extent of this oligarchic reach.

7 _ The Nixon-Reagan neoliberal projects focused on a republican "Southern Strategy" in response to the success of the civil rights movements, as civil rights legislation of 1964 and 1965 had rendered illegal discrimina-

tion on the basis of race. Since discrimination against African Americans continued *de facto*, republican elites had hoped to transform the Southern democratic vote of white citizens into a republican vote through the use of racialized discourses. The "Southern Strategy" included a "war on drugs", in which Black citizens were disproportionately punished. Mass incarceration began. See M. ALEXANDER, *The New Jim Crow. Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color Blindness*, New Press, New York 2011. The *Fair Sentencing* Act of 2010 adjusted the ratio between black and white men in the severity of punishment on drug convictions to 18 to 1. Before legislation was passed, the ratio was 100 to 1. In addition, when the NAACP promoted unified school districts in order to contain re-segregation tendencies in urban centers, a Supreme Court decision, *Milliken v. Bradley*, essentially provided the constitutional conditions for re-segregation. A dual educational system advantaged the nascent information-technological occupational strata at the expense of a young minority population whose schools were underfunded and whose social and family structures were impacted by the rise in incarceration rates among African American citizens. A critique on the neo-liberal assaults on the university if reflected in M. BERUBE's and C. NELSON's *Higher Education under Fire. Politics, Economics, and the Crisis of the Humanities*, Routledge, New York and London 1995. For assaults on "affirmative actions" in this context see R. HOLUB, *Difference, Integration, Transcommunality: The Case of California*, in *Differenz und Integration. Die Zukunft moderner Gesellschaften*, ed. Stefan Hradil, Campus

Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1997, pp. 985-1003. I am indebted to Peter Temin for the evidence on the ideological policy connections between infrastructure, education, criminal justice, incarceration, and racism.

8 _ Among the many recent subdivisions within these expanding research fields are world cinema studies, world television studies, American media and World War II.

9 _ My evidence is based on my study of the history of US based *Cultural Studies* journals such as *Cultural Critique*, *Cultural Studies and Critical Methodology*, *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, *Discourse*, *Berkeley Journal of Media and Culture*, *Camera Obscura*, *Differences. A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies Review*, *Journal of African American Studies*. I have also consulted many of the volumes in the Routledge Series on Media and Cultural Studies as well as the appropriate Series of other publishers.

10 _ See R. HOLUB, *Dagli studi culturali allo studio delle culture americane: 1977-2007*, in *Gramsci le culture e il mondo*, ed. Giancarlo Schirru, Viella, Roma 2009.

11 _ D. KELLNER, *Television and the Crisis of Democracy*, Westview Press, Boulder (Co.) 1990. One of the most prolific critics of the spectacle-culture's relations to politics, he has published on the *Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy: terrorism, war, and election battles* (Paradigm, Boulder [Co.] 2005) and more recently *Cinema Wars, Hollywood Film and Politics in the Bush-Cheney Era* (Wiley-Blackwell, Malden [Ma.] 2010). Kellner is also the editor of a number of Herbert Marcuse publications, some of which focus on technology and fascism.

12 _ See K. KELLY, *What Technology Wants*, Penguin Books, New York 2010; he is the editor of one of the most prestigious internet magazines, *Wired*.

13 _ See S. VAIDHYANATHAN, *The Googliza-tion of Everything* (*And Why We Should Wor-ry*), The University of California Press, Berkeley (Ca.) 2012.

14 _ S. TURKLE, *The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1984; ID., *Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet*, Simon & Schuster, New York 1997; ID., *Alone Together: Why we expect more from Technology and Less from Each Oth-er*, Basic Books, New York 2011; ID., *Reclaim-ing Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age*, Penguin Press, New York 2015.

15 _ Among the most outspoken intellectu-als on this subject are Manuel Castells and Hen-ry Jenkins. See M. CASTELLS, *Communication Power*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009. For H. JENKINS see *Fans, Bloggers, and Gamers. Exploring Participatory Cultures*, New York Uni-versity Press, New York 2006.

16 _ This debate took place from 2011-2014 in the Journal *Cultural Studies*.

17 _ M. LANDY, *Socialist Education Today: Pessimism or Optimism of the intellect?*, in *Re-thinking Gramsci*, ed. Marcus E. Green, Rout-ledge, New York 2011; EAD., *Film, Politics, and Gramsci*, The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1994; *Gramsci in and on Media*, in *The Politics, Culture and Social Theory of Gramsci: A Multidisciplinary Perspective*, ed. Joseph Francese, Routledge, New York 2009); EAD., *Gramsci, Passive Revolution, and Media*, «Boundary 2», 35 (2008) 3, pp. 99-131.

18 _ There are a number of initial difficul-ties in assessing the current "Gramsci research output in the US". Who should count as a Gramsci researcher in the US? Quite a few au-thors are not US intellectuals by residence or citizenship, while others who reside in the US or are US citizens, have, as immigrants, intellectual roots elsewhere. The criteria I have used are the following: book publications in the US, publi-cations in US journals, publications by US resi-dents or citizens in foreign journals. What they have in common is that all three groups partic-ipate in the unfolding development of Gram-sci's thought in international culture. When compared with an earlier generation of Gramsci scholars in the US, as of that of the last quarter of the twentieth century – Marcia Landy (1994), Renate Holub (1992), John Cammett (1991), Robert Dombroski (1989), Maurice Finocchia-ro (1988), Carl Boggs (1984); Walter Adamson (1980), Paul Piccone (1973) – it turns out that almost half of them were immigrants as well.

19 _ *Gramsci, Political Economy, and In-ternational Relations Theory. Modern Princes and Naked Emperors*, ed. Alison Ayers, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008; K. BRUHN, *Antonio Gramsci and the Palabra Verdadera: The Political Discourse of Mexico's Guerilla Forces*, «Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs», 41 (1999), pp. 29-56; R. BURGOS, *The Ups and Downs of an Uncomfortable Legacy*, «Latin American Per-spectives», 42 (2015) 5, pp. 169-185; R. CIAVOLEL-LA, *Huunde fof ko Politik. Everything is Politics: Gramsci, Fulani, and the Margins of the State in Mauritania*, «Africa Today», 58 (2012) 3, pp. 2-21; C. GORLIER, *Post-Marxism in an African Context: The Usability of Antonio Gramsci*, «Research in

African Literatures», 33 (2002) 3, pp. 98-105; N. Henck, *The Subcommander and the Sardinian: Marcos and Gramsci*, «Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos», 29 (2013) 2, pp. 428-458; E. Sio-ieng Hui, *Putting the Chinese State in its Place: A March from Passive Revolution to Hegemony*, «Journal of Contemporary Asia», 47 (2017) 1, pp. 66-92.

20 _ M. Ekers, A. Loftus, *Revitalizing the Production of Nature Thesis: A Gramscian Turn?*, «Progress in Human Geography», 37 (2013) 2, pp. 234-252; B. Fontana, *The Concept of Nature in Gramsci*, in *Gramsci, Space, Nature, Politics*, eds. Michael Ekers, Gillian Hart, Stefan Kipfer and Alex Loftius, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, Malden (Ma.) 2013; J. McSweeney, *The Absence of Class: Critical Development, NGOs and the Misuse of Gramsci's Concept of Counter-Hegemony*, «Progress in Development Studies», 14 (2014) 3, pp. 275-285.

21 _ M. Briziarelli, S. Martinez Guillem, *Reviving Gramsci: Crisis, Communication, and Change*, Routledge, New York 2016.

22 _ P. Seybold, *Radical Legacies: Antonio Gramsci and Contemporary American Politics*, «Humanity & Society», 37 (2013) 2, pp. 286-305; D. Bjelic, *Maternal Space and Intellectual Labour: Gramsci versus Kristeva and Zizek*, «College Literature», (2014) 2, pp. 29-55; L.E. Ruberto, *Gramsci, Migration, and the Representation of Women's Work in Italy and the US*, Lexington Books, Lanham 2007; D.F. Ruccio, *Rethinking Gramsci: Class, Globalization, and Historical Bloc*, in *The Politics, Culture and Social Theory of Gramsci*, cit.

23 _ B. Grelle, *Antonio Gramsci and the Question of Religion: Ideology, Ethics, and Hegemony*, Routledge, New York 2017.

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32 _ http://www/americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkatimetobreaksilence.htm.

33 _ For a synthetic brief on the "Birmingham Moment" see P. ANDERSON, *The H-Word. The Peripeteia of Hegemony*, Verso, London 2017, pp. 85-116. This is a concise review of the adventures of the concept of hegemony with an eye to its use in international relations theory of the global hegemons.

34 _ *Ibidem*.

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36 _ «Si vedrà una di quelle vichiane "astuzie della providenza" per cui gli uomini senza proporselo e senza volerlo ubbidiscano agli imperativi della storia?» (*Quaderni*, 22, § 6, p. 2157).